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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased
sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that
the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may
be fully reviewed on appeal."8 9
In State v. Rutledge,4 the record was barren of any reason
for increasing the original one-year sentence to two and a half
years. Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court remanded the case
for re-sentencing in conformity with the Pearce decision. If
there had been a justification for the increased sentence, it was
too late to supply that factual data after the appeal was taken.
Under the Pearce and Rutledge decisions, the sentencing
judge who increases the sentence after a re-conviction must point
to some substantial additional considerations which were not
available at the time of the original sentence, and this factual
basis must be made a matter of record when the new sentence
is imposed.
EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh*
WrrNESSES
Examination of Witnesses-Responsiveness
An attorney questioning a witness, whether on direct or
cross-examination, may insist that the answer given by the wit-
ness be responsive to the question, i.e., that the witness answer
the question asked and only the question asked. In State v.
Rouse,' involving theft by the use of a credit card, the prosecuting
witness (the person to whom the credit card had been issued)
was asked on cross-examination whether the bank (who appar-
ently had issued the credit card) had ever confirmed to him
that they had received his notification of the loss of the credit
card. To this question the witness replied:
"Well on November the 7th Mr. Ross Johnston called me
and advised me that a receipt had shown up or they had
gotten a call from a place in Baton Rouge that my card had
been used in the name of Joe B. Smith for a lodging in a
39. 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969).
40. 250 So.2d 734 (La. 1971).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 256 La. 275, 236 So.2d 211 (1970).
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motel and that a T.V. set had been stolen from that motel
and they were checking to see if Mr. Johnston knows a Joe
B. Smith."2
Over a dissenting opinion by Justice Barham, the supreme court
affirmed the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury to disregard
the witness's answer as unresponsive. The supreme court held
that the question was responsive; that it confirmed the loss; that
absent special circumstances under which a witness is instructed
by the court to the contrary, he may properly explain his answer;
and that the response in question fell under the category of an
explanation of an answer.
The writer agrees with the dissenting Justice in finding the
answer unresponsive, for the answer does not state whether the
bank confirmed to the witness that they had received his message
about the loss. Instead, it relates a statement by the bank rep-
resentative concerning an inquiry by a third person suggesting
that an individual using the credit card issued to the prosecuting
witness might have stolen a television set. Not only does it
appear unresponsive, but also highly prejudicial, for it wafts
an innuendo that defendant, in addition to unauthorized use of
a credit card, might also have filched a television set.
Scope of Cross-Examination
It is said that prior to 1928, when Louisiana's first Code of
Criminal Procedure was adopted, the law regulating the scope
of cross-examination was "chaotic." 8 Articles 376 and 462 of
that Code,4 however, made it clear that Louisiana had adopted
the so-called "broad rule" of cross-examination for criminal
cases 5-that a witness who "has been intentionally sworn and
has testified to any single fact in his examination in chief ...
may be cross-examined upon the whole case." Under article
462 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,7 a defendant who takes
the stand is "subject to all the rules that apply to other wit-
nesses" and hence, it seems quite clear that it was intended that
the "broad rule" of cross-examination is to apply to a defendant
2. Id. at 279, 236 So.2d at 212.
3. Comment, 10 TUL. L. REv. 294, 297 (1938).
4. Now LA. R.S. 15:280 and 462 (1950), respectively.
5. For a discussion of the problem in Louisiana civil cases, see Comment,
10 TuL. L. Rv. 294 (1936).
6. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 376, now LA. R.S. 15:280 (1950).
7. Now LA. R.S. 15:462 (1950).
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who takes the stand and becomes a witness at the trial on the
question of guilt or innocence.8 It has been properly held, how-
ever, that a defendant has the right to take the stand out of the
presence of the jury for the restricted purpose of testifying as
to the involuntariness of his alleged confession,9 and the same
approach should probably be taken to permit a defendant to
testify on a motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained by
illegal means. 10
It is interesting, perhaps, to note that the federal courts fol-
low the "narrow rule" of cross-examination, and hence a defen-
dant in federal court who takes the stand, in effect, waives his
privilege against self-incrimination only as to matters connected
with the subjects covered on direct examination." An argument
can be made that because of Malloy v. Hogan 2 and its applica-
tion of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
to the states through the fourteenth amendment, the states may
now be obliged to apply the "narrow rule" of cross-examination
when a defendant takes the stand."3 It is hoped, however, that
any such argument would be rejected, for the "broad rule" seems
much the sounder approach.
There have been very few Louisiana cases since 1928 dis-
cussing cross-examination of a defendant who takes the stand
to testify in his own behalf at trial before the jury. The legis-
lative action in that year to institute the "broad rule" of cross-
examination was somewhat confused and undermined during
the past term by language in State v. Richardson,4 wherein the
court, by way of dictum, quoted with approval a 1913 opinion 15
which set forth a "narrow rule" of cross-examination in such
cases. However, the court in Richardson after citing and quoting
from the applicable statutory authority, upheld the instant cross-
examination of defendant, and presumably will continue to apply
the "broad rule" of cross-examination in future cases.
8. See State v. Sanderson, 169 La. 55, 124 So. 143 (1929).
9. State v. Thomas, 208 La. 548, 23 So.2d 212 (1945).
10. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). But cf. State v.
Coleman, 254 La. 264, 223 So.2d 402 (1969), in which it is unclear to this writer
whether defendant's offer to testify on the voluntariness question only was
made with respect to testimony outside or in the presence of the jury.
11. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 416 (1969).
12. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
13. In this connection see Tucker v. United States, 5 F.2d 818 (8th Cir.
1925).
14. 258 La. 62, 245 So.2d 357 (1971).
15. State v. Bellard, 132 La. 491, 61 So. 537 (1913).
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IMPEACHMENT
Testimony Given Before a Grand Jury
If a witness tells a different story at a criminal trial than
that told by him before the grand jury, may the state use the
grand jury testimony to impeach him? Relying on provisions
of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure establishing the
secrecy of grand jury proceedings, 6 Justice Summers, speaking
for the majority of the court in State v. Terrebonne,T held that
it could not. The two dissenting justices argued that under R.S.
15:493 a witness may be impeached by any prior contradictory
statement.'8 The writer agrees with the majority, believing that
R.S. 15:493 should not be read as broadly as contended by the
the dissent, but rather should be interpreted as stating that
whenever impeachment by prior contradictory statement is to
be made, a prescribed foundation is to be laid. A forceful argu-
ment may be made in favor of a legislative relaxation of the
statutory rules relative to secrecy of the grand jury proceedings
which would permit a defendant, under appropriate circum-
stances, to have access to them. In the absence of such access
by the defense, however, it would seem unduly one-sided to
permit the state to use grand jury testimony to impeach when,
16. See especially article 434:
"Members of the grand jury, all other persons present at a grand jury
meeting, and all persons having confidential access to information con-
cerning grand jury proceedings, shall keep secret the testimony of
witnesses and all other matters occurring at, or directly connected with,
a meeting of the grand jury. However, after the indictment, such per-
sons may reveal statutory irregularities In grand jury proceedings to
defense counsel, the district attorney, or the court, and may testify con-
cerning them. Such persons may disclose testimony given before the
grand jury, at any time when permitted by the court, to show that a
witness committed perjury in his testimony before the grand jury. A
witness may discuss his testimony given before the grand jury with
counsel for a person under investigation or indicted, with the district
attorney, or with the court.
"Any person who violates the provisions of this article shall be in
constructive contempt of court."
17. 256 La. 385, 236 So.2d 773 (1970).
18. LA. R.S. 15:493 (1950):
"Whenever the credibility of a witness is to be impeached by proof of
any statement made by him contradictory to his testimony, he must
first be asked whether he has made such statement, and his attention
must be called to the time, place and circumstances, and to the persons
to whom the alleged statement was made, in order that the witness may
have an opportunity of explaining that which Is prima facie contradic-
tory. If the witness does not distinctly admit making such statement,
evidence that he did make it is admissible."
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because of the secrecy rule, defendant is not permitted a similar
opportunity.
Prior Inconsistent Statements
In State v. Williams0 and State v. Ray,20 the court reiter-
ated the traditional principle that the prior inconsistent state-
ment of a non-party witness may be used to tear down or neutral-
ize testimony given by the witness on the stand, but not as sub-
stantive proof of the truth of the contents of the out-of-court
utterance. A line of cases had held that where the out-of-court
utterance by a non-party witness implicated the defendant, the
trial court was required, of its own motion, to give a contempo-
raneous instruction as to the limited use of the evidence. 21 In
State v. Ray, the majority of the court, in an opinion authored
by Justice Sanders, reconsidered and rejected the latter rule,
taking the position that although defendants in the instant case
could avail themselves of the rule, the case providing for it
would be overruled prospectively. In cases hereafter tried, a
defendant is to have the burden of requesting such limiting in-
structions. The writer fully agrees with this position taken by
the court in the Ray case; a trial court should not be burdened
with the obligation of giving such instruction ex proprio motu.
In light of the prior jurisprudence, however, the writer shares
the court's feeling that the defendants in the instant case should
not be deprived of the overly generous protection afforded by
the ill-advised rule; prospective overruling in such a context
seems very appropriate.
EXPERT WImNEssEs
Chiropractors and Unlicensed Physicians
R.S. 37:1284 provides that an unlicensed physician shall not
"be allowed to testify as a medical or surgical expert in any
court." Does the statute prohibit the reception of depositions
containing expert testimony from out-of-state physicians? The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Hebert v. Travelers Indemnity
Co.22 properly held that it does not-that the purpose of the
19. 258 La. 251, 246 So.2d 4 (1971).
20. 259 La. 105, 249 So.2d 540 (1971).
21. See State v. Barbar, 250 La. 509, 197 So.2d 69 (1967) and State v. Reed,
49 La. 704, 21 So. 732 (1897).
22. 239 So.2d 867 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
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statute was rather to prevent unlicensed physicians practicing
in Louisiana from testifying as experts in the courts of this state.
Louisiana does not license chiropractors as such, and for
chiropractors to be licensed they must obtain a medical license
in accordance with the provisions of the Louisiana Medical Prac-
tice Act.23 In Louisiana the practice of chiropractic is the prac-
tice of medicine and is regulated as such.24 May an unlicensed
chiropractor testify as an expert in a Louisiana court? Follow-
ing a prior decision to the same effect by the Third Circuit Court
of Appeal,25 the First Circuit, in Ducote v. Allstate Insurance
Co.,26 permitted a chiropractor to testify as an expert. In neither
case, however, was the above-mentioned statute cited or dis-
cussed. In light of the statute and pertinent jurisprudence,2 7
it seems to this writer that unlicensed chiropractors should Be
held incapable of testifying as experts in Louisiana courts.
RELEvANcY
Other Crimes
In accordance with the presumption of innocence2 and the
principle that a defendant's character is not at issue in a criminal
case unless he places it at issue, there is a well-recognized rule
that past acts of misconduct allegedly committed by the defen-
dant are inadmissible on the state's case-in-chief unless they
have an independent relevancy, as, for example, to show knowl-
edge, intent, plan, etc." These rules are fundamental to Anglo-
American criminal procedure, protecting the defendant from the
prejudice that would otherwise arise in the jury's mind from
23. LA. R.S. 37:1261 (1950). See Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Exam-
iners .v. Fife, 162 La. 681, 111 So. 58 (1927). The Louisiana practice in this
regard has been recently upheld as constitutional by the United States
Supreme Court: England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 246
F. Supp. 993 (E.D. La. 1965), aff'd, 384 U.S. 885 (1966).
24. See Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Fife, 162 La. 681,
111 So. 58 (1927); Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Cronk, 157
La. 321, 102 So. 415 (1924).
25. Carvell v. Winn, 154 So.2d 788 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
26. 242 So.2d 103 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 257 La. 618, 243
So.2d 532 (1971).
27. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 246 F. Supp.
993 (E.D. La. 1965), af'd, 384 U.S. 885 (1966); Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners v. Fife, 162 La. 681, 111 So. 58 (1927); Louisiana State Bd. of
Medical Examiners v. Cronk, 157 La. 321, 102 So. 415 (1924).
28. LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 804.
29. See LA. R.S. 15:445 and 446 (1950).
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knowledge that he is a man with a sordid past. 0 Both State v.
Montegut3 ' and State v. Spencer3 2 afford splendid examples of
instances in which past criminal acts by a defendant are properly
admissible as being independently relevant to show plan, scheme,
system, etc.3 3 In both cases the state was permitted to show
that at a time very near the occasions in question (a few days
before in one case and a few days after in another), defendant
had perpetrated an armed robbery on the same person at the
same place. Even in such cases, however, it may well be that
fairness demands, as Justice Barham suggests,3 4 that the state
put the defendant on notice of its intent to introduce such evi-
dence. 85
State v. Bolden s 6 on the other hand, seems to this writer to
provide an example of the kind of evidence the rules were de-
signed to exclude. The state, in an aggravated rape case, was
permitted to call a witness to testify that two years prior to the
instant alleged offense defendant had purportedly attempted
aggravated rape upon her. Over vigorous and cogent dissents
by Justices Barham and Tate, the supreme court affirmed. Both
dissenting justices questioned the constitutionality of the use
of such evidence. There apparently was no connection between
the two alleged rapes. The real pertinence of the evidence
appears to have been to show the disposition of the defendant
to commit this type of crime, i.e., character. The failure to give
defendant advance notice of such crime seems to involve a very
serious question of notice and hearing.3 7
30. For prior discussion see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1968-1969 Term-Evidence, 30 LA. REV. 321 (1969).
31. 257 La. 670, 243 So.2d 793 (1971).
32. 257 La. 672, 243 So.2d 793 (1971).
33. See State v. Hurst, 257 La. 595, 243 So.2d 269 (1971) (prior robberies of
other victims in same general area with similar methods of operation within
three week period held admissible to show intent); State v. Montegut, 257
La. 665, 243 So.2d 791 (1971) (evidence of robbery of another victim in close
proximity of time under very similar circumstances held admissible to show
system and intent); State v. Pesson, 256 La. 201, 235 So.2d 568 (1970) (prior
acts of abortion allegedly committed by defendant held admissible as tend-
ing to show intent).
34. 257 La. 672, 679 n.1, 243 So.2d 793, 796 n.1 (1971).
35. See the discussion in State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 149 N.W.2d
281 (1967) and State v. Sprelgl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965).
36. 257 La. 60, 241 So.2d 490 (1970).
37. See dissent in State v. Spencer, 257 La. 672, 679 n.1, 243 So.2d 793,
796 n.1 (1971). Bee note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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Gruesome Photographs
In State v. Washington,88 Justice Sanders, speaking for the
court, sets forth a good, workable statement as to the admissi-
bility of gruesome photographs in criminal cases, recognizing
that whether or not they are admissible depends on the bal-
ancing of the probative value of the evidence against the risk
of undue prejudice.8 9
CONFRONTATION AND COMPULSORY PROCESS
In State v. Holmes,4° a very disturbing murder case, instead
of calling the attending physician or coroner to establish cause
of death (a much controverted issue), the prosecution offered
in evidence an "autopsy report" prepared by the coroner. Code
of Criminal Procedure article 105 provides that "A coroner's
report and a proc~s verbal of an autopsy shall be competent evi-
dence of death and the cause thereof, but not of any other fact."
There seems to be considerable doubt as to whether the docu-
ment in question met the statutory requirements. The majority
of the Louisiana Supreme Court, however, upheld the trial court's
reception of the proffered evidence to establish cause of death,
as well as the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a
continuance until the coroner himself could be examined by
defendant as a defense witness relative to cause of death.
It seems to this writer that dissenting Justices Barham and
Tate argue most persuasively that defendant was denied his
constitutional rights of confrontation 4' and compulsory process. 42
Where the coroner is dead or otherwise unavailable, it may
be reasonable to permit the introduction of his official statement
as to cause of death. If the coroner is available, the statute
should at least afford defendant the right to call him under cross-
examination, as is provided in the Louisiana statute regulating
admissibility of hospital records. 43 The use of the coroner's
report under the facts of the instant case, coupled with the court's
38. 256 La. 233, 236 So.2d 23 (1970).
39. For discussion of prior cases on the subject, see The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1960-1961 Term-Evidence, 22 LA. L. Rsv.
397, 399 (1962) and discussions cited therein.
40. 258 La. 221, 245 So.2d 707 (1971).
41. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) and State v. Tims, 9 Ohio
St.2d 136, 224 N.E.2d 348 (1967).
42. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
43. LA. R.S. 13:3714 (1950), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Ap-
pe~late Courts for the 1969-1970 Term--Evidence, 31 LA. L. REv. 381, 388
(1971). Contrast also the rules regulating admissibility at the trial on the
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denial of defendant's motion for a brief continuance, seem to
this writer to have denied the defendant due process of law.
This was a murder case; the state had previously subpoenaed
the coroner; defense counsel arguably was not unreasonable in
relying upon such subpoena to secure the presence of the cor-
oner; defense counsel immediately moved to subpoena the cor-
oner and requested a continuance when he discovered that the
coroner was not to testify on behalf of the state; it presumably
would have involved but a short delay to secure the presence
of this important public official (who, it appears, was within the
state attending a convention).
HEARSAY
The rights of confrontation 4 4 and compulsory process,45
and the hearsay rule, are all interrelated. Violation of the hear-
say rule may involve a denial of federal constitutional rights
and hence afford an aggrieved criminal defendant access to fed-
eral court.46 Several very important cases concerning applica-
bility of the hearsay rule were decided by the Louisiana Supreme
Court during the past term.
What is or is not hearsay is a perennial problem.47 In State
v. Maiden,48 an opinion authored by Justice Sanders, the court
very properly held that, when the issue at the trial is identity,
for a witness to testify to another witness's out-of-court identi-
fication of one of the defendants at a line-up is hearsay.49 De-
spite language in another decision 0 that the testimony as to a
person's out-of-court conduct is not hearsay, it seems to this
merits of testimony of persons appointed to a sanity commission relative
to the mental state of the defendant at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, and the intended inadmissibility of the report itself. LA.
CODE CRIM. P. art. 653 and official revision comments. But see in this con-
nection LA. R.S. 15:425 (1950).
44. See discussion of State v. Holmes, 258 La. 221, 245 So.2d 707 (1971)
supra.
45. See Comment, Hearsay, The Confrontation Guarantee and Related
Problems, 30 LA. L. REv. 651 (1970).
46. See State v. Favre, 255 La. 690, 232 So.2d 479 (1970), discussed in
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Court for the 1969-1970 Term, 31 LA. L.
REV. 386 (1971), and on writ of habeas corpus in federal court, Favre v.
Henderson, 318 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. La. 1970), 444 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1971).
47. See Comment, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay as Reflected in Louisiana
Criminal Cases, 14 LA. L. REv. 611 (1954).
48. 258 La. 417, 246 So.2d 810 (1971).
49. The court held, however, that under these circumstances Its admis-
sion was harmless error.
50. State v. Roach, 256 La. 408, 236 So.2d 782 (1970).
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writer that whether out-of-court conduct is or is not hearsay
depends on whether the conduct was assertive in character, and
if so, whether it is offered in court to prove the truth of the out-
of-court assertion. 51 Often the relevance of out-of-court state-
ments or conduct is to show the fact of the statement or conduct
rather than to show the truth of an out-of-court assertion. A
statement used for such a purpose is not hearsay, as was well-
illustrated by two decisions rendered during the past term.52
The fact of a complaint offered on a motion to suppress to show
that there was probable cause for the arrest is a non-hearsay
use of an out-of-court assertion, as recognized by the supreme
court in State v. McQueen.58 Similarly, the fact of a woman's
offer to an "undercover" police plainclothesman to prostitute
herself, coupled with acceptance by her of three twenty-dollar
bills, was admissible non-hearsay in a prosecution of defendant
for receiving support and maintenance from the earnings of a
prostitute. Justice Sanders, speaking for the court, stated:
"The evidentiary question is whether the words of solici-
tation were spoken. Without the words, the transfer of
money to the barmaid is at best ambiguous. Under these cir-
cumstances, her conversation with the .officer is usable, not to
prove the truth of the content, but that the utterance oc-
curred. The utterance gives color to the non-verbal conduct.
The officer, of course, is able to testify as to her statement
from his own perception. Such evidence is non-hearsay.
Because of its relevance, it is admissible in the present case.
State v. Kay, 176 La. 294, 145 So. 544; State v. Thomas,
supra; McCormick on Evidence, § 228, pp. 463, 464 (1954);
6 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.), § 1772, pp. 190-192.""
By far the most interesting case on the subject decided dur-
ing the past term was State v. Raymond,55 a murder prosecution
in which the defendant had been convicted of manslaughter.
51. See Faulknor, The "Hear-Say" Rule as a "See-Do" Rule, 33 ROCKY
MT. L. Rsv. 133 (1961); Comment, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay as Reflected in
Louisiana Criminal Cases, 14 LA. L. Rmv. 611 (1954); UNIFORM RULES OF EVI-
DENCE, RULE 62(1).
52. State v. Gonzales, 258 La. 103, 245 So.2d 372 (1971) and State v. Mc-
Queen, 257 La. 684, 243 So.2d 798 (1971).
53. 257 La. 684, 243 So.2d 798 (1971). This case is to be contrasted with
State v. Favre, 255 La. 690, 232 So.2d 479 (1970), and on writ of habeas
corpus in federal court, Favre v. Henderson, 318 F.Supp. 1384 (E.D. La. 1970).
444 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1971).
54. State v. Gonzales, 258 La. 103, 107, 245 So.2d 372, 373 (1971).
55. 258 La. 1, 245 So.2d 335 (1971).
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There was testimony that a couple of hours before the victim
(a young male) was seen getting into a car and riding off with
defendant, the defendant drove up to the place where the victim
was and inquired about the victim's whereabouts. Over objec-
tion, the trial court permitted the witness to state that as de-
fendant approached, the victim said "that punk" would want to
have unnatural sexual relations with him that night, and then
hid behind a tree. The majority of the supreme court sustained
the action of the trial court, holding (1) that the proffered evi-
dence was not hearsay, but rather was circumstantial evidence
used to show the state of mind of the victim reflecting his fear
or "emotional reaction to the presence of the defendant," and
(2) that if, arguendo, it was hearsay, then it was admissible
either under the declaration of mental state or res gestae excep-
tions.50
In the opinion of the writer the evidence should have been
excluded, and its admission raises serious federal constitutional
questions relative to possible violation of defendant's right of
confrontation. Although the court forcefully argued that the
evidence should be treated as non-hearsay, as circumstantial
evidence of the victim's state of mind,57 the difficulty, it is sub-
mitted, is that the victim's state of mind was not a fact in issue.M
Most statements manifest a declarant's state of mind, but whether
or not an out-of-court utterance is admissible to show that state
of mind normally depends upon the relationship between the
declarant's state of mind and the event in question. Where the
issue is whether a declarant did or did not do a particular act,
an antecedent statement by the declarant expressing an intent
to do the act is often admissible to show that he thereafter ful-
filled the expressed intention.59 Where, however, the real rele-
vance of the statement is backward-looking in character, it is
submitted that the evidence should be excluded, as was well
56. Justice Tate in his concurring opinion stated that although he had
"reservations as to the rationale of the majority opinion," he would hold
the evidence "admissible as tending to show immediately antecedent cir-
cumstances explanatory of the killing and tending to connect the accused
with it." 258 La. 1, 22, 245 So.2d 335, 342 (1971). In the opinion of the writer,
the argument advanced in the text against the admissibility of the proffered
evidence applies likewise to this suggested alternative avenue of admissi-
bility.
57. See Comment, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay as Reflected In Louisiana
Criminal Cases, 14 LA. L. Rv. 611 (1954).
58. See Wright v. Tatham, 5 CI. & Fin. 670, 7 Eng. Rep. 550 (H.L. 1888).
59. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
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recognized by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Shepard v. United States.6 0
If the proffered evidence had been a statement by the victim
to the defendant that he planned to discontinue sexual relations
with him, then the statement would surely have been admissible
as tending to show defendant's state of mind, giving him a motive
for the crime. Instead, however, this was a statement made by
the victim to a third party adverting to prior unnatural (and
highly prejudicial) sexual acts, which presumably would have
significant impact on the mind of the jury.6 ' The thrust of the
statement is that the victim did not want to be with the defen-
dant and thus, this statement is to be contrasted with cases of
a declaration of future intent offered to show that the intent
was in fact carried out.6 2
As Justice Barham points out in his dissenting opinion, since
the statement is disconnected in time and place with the homi-
cide, it does not appear to meet the test of R.S. 15:447 and 448
for admissibility as part of the res gestae. This was an unsworn
accusation against defendant from a person now deceased, of
antecedent unnatural sexual acts; defendant had no opportunity
to cross-examine the victim. In the opinion of the writer, whether
or not the statement is classified as hearsay, it should have been
excluded for the same reasons that give rise to the hearsay ex-
clusionary rule.
Admissions-Civil Cases
To show contributory negligence, defendant insurance com-
pany in Farris v. Bakere8 offered a statement taken and written
by its insurance adjuster, signed by plaintiff. At the trial the
plaintiff denied having made the statement, but did not deny
signing the document attributed to her. The Second Circuit Court
of Appeal upheld the trial court's exclusion of the proffered evi-
dence, pointing out that the plaintiff had only a fourth grade
education, and that the insurance adjuster had neither been
called to testify in the case nor had his deposition been taken.
It seems to this writer, however, that the document, since it was
60. 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
61. See concurring opinion of Justice Tate, 258 La. 1, 20, 245 So.2d 335,
342 (1971) and dissenting opinion of Justice Barham, 258 La. 1, 22, 245 So.
2d 335, 343 (1971).
62. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892). Cf. People
v. Alcalde, 24 Cal.2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944).
63. 240 So.2d 410 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
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apparently signed by the plaintiff and offered by the defendant,
should have been admissible against the plaintiff as an admis-
sion, and that the factors relied upon for exclusion should have
gone to the weight to be given the statement rather than its
admissibility.
Admissions-Criminal Cases
Article 768 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
if the state intends to introduce a confession or inculpatory
statement, it shall give written notice to the defendant before
the trial, and if it fails to do so the confession or inculpatory
statement is inadmissible in evidence. In State v. Lacoste,6 4 by
inadvertence and in good faith, the prosecution had failed to
give the defendant the required notice until after a number of
witnesses had testified. A divided supreme court held that the
trial judge had not abused his discretion, and, alternatively, that
if the trial judge had committed error, it was not a "substantial
violation of a constitutional or statutory right" within the mean-
ing of article 921 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In a very
persuasive dissent Justice Sanders pointed out that article 768
uses mandatory language. He argued therefore that the matter
is not one of discretion, and further, that the statutory right
involved is a substantial right and hence, that defendant should
have been granted a new trial.
Res Gestae
In State v. Richard,"" a prosecution for possession of mari-
juana, the supreme court upheld the trial court's overruling of
defendant's objection to witnesses' testimony that in searching
the defendant pursuant to his arrest, they had found some pills
in his shirt pocket and a plastic vial containing capsules. So far
as the record discloses, there was no evidence that the pills
or capsules contained narcotics. The supreme court, however,
agreed with the trial court that the evidence was admissible
as part of the res gestae. With deference, it is submitted that
the mere fact that something is found pursuant to an arrest
should not cause it to be admissible as part of the res gestae, if
it is otherwise irrelevant. For example, if a defendant in a
murder case had a lewd and lascivious picture in his wallet at
64. 256 La. 697, 237 So.2d 871 (1970).
65. 256 La. 551, 237 So.2d 374 (1970).
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the time of his arrest, this should not cause the picture to be
admissible. The fact that the defendant possessed it at the time
of his arrest does not necessarily make it relevant, and its intro-
duction might well prejudice the jury. If possession of the pills
and capsules were illegal, then defendant should perhaps have
been prosecuted for illegal possession of same in another pro-
ceeding, but again there was no showing that the pills and cap-
sules in question were contraband or relevant. Under the cir-
cumstances of the instant case, the admission of the evidence
may not have been prejudicial, but it appears unfortunate to
this writer for the court to have held that the pills were admis-
sible as part of the res gestae.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
What may be seized and searched incidental to a lawful
arrest? In State v. Mejia," the supreme court took what seems
to this writer an unduly broad approach. Pursuant to a search
incidental to the legal arrest of defendant for murder in St.
Charles Parish, police authorities discovered two claim checks
to luggage deposited at a bus station in New Orleans, which
police officers had good reason to believe contained the murder
weapon, a .22-caliber pistol. Without obtaining a search warrant,
police officials retrieved the luggage, and, searching same, found
the weapon.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the pistol had been
legally seized incidental to a lawful arrest, reasoning that de-
fendant had been in constructive possession of the suitcases
at the time of his arrest and that, by obtaining lawful possession
of the claim checks, the police became entitled to the possession
of the suitcases and hence, had the right to search them. With
deference, the writer disagrees. The purpose of the search war-
rant requirement of the fourth amendment is to protect the
privacy of individuals by insisting upon independent evaluation
of evidence by an impartial magistrate. The rule permitting
search of the person and the area under his immediate control
incidental to a lawful arrest is in the nature of an exception to
the search warrant requirement-a concession to practical neces-
sity intended to prevent an arrested person from arming him-
self, or concealing or destroying evidence.67 In the instant case
66. 257 La. 310, 242 So.2d 525 (1970).
67. See Chimel v. California, 393 U.S. 958 (1968) and State v. Roach, 259
La. 408, 236 So.2d 782 (1970).
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it appears that there was ample time for police authorities to
secure a search warrant, and thus obtain independent determi-
nation of probable cause by an impartial magistrate.
State v. Roach 8 concerned the admissibility of narcotics and
narcotics paraphernalia found in the kitchen of defendant, al-
legedly incidental to the arrest of a third party in the kitchen.
Finding that the arrest of the third person was but a pretext
for entering and searching the home of the defendant, a divided
court held that, under the circumstances, the search was un-
reasonable. 69
In State v. Lawson7" the supreme court upheld the trial
court's suppression of evidence, finding that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to support the police officer's contention that de-
fendant had been arrested for failure to yield to an emergency
vehicle, and that the arrest for this infraction was a pretext to
search for evidence. The supreme court concluded, therefore,
that evidence obtained as a result of the arrest must be sup-
pressed.
BILL OF EXcEPTIONS
State v. Barnes7' affords an excellent example of the need
for overhaul of Louisiana's archaic bill of exceptions procedure.
For traditional reasons eloquently and persuasively denounced
by dissenting Justices Tate, Dixon, and Barham, the court re-
fused to consider the merits of objections raised by defendant-
appellant, on the grounds that several of his bills of exceptions
had not been properly perfected. Although the present system
is perhaps appropriate to a bygone era, Louisiana now needs a
much more efficient, non-technical method of preserving one's
rights on appeal in criminal cases. Where federal constitutional
rights are involved Louisiana's present anachronistic rule may
well be unconstitutional as violative of federal rules relative to
knowing intentional waiver of federal constitutional rights, as
suggested by Justice Tate.72
68. 256 La. 408, 236 So.2d 782 (1970).
69. In so holding the court relied heavily on Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S.
452 (1932).
70. 256 La. 471, 236 So.2d 804 (1970).
71. 257 La. 1017, 245 So.2d 159 (1971) cert denied, 92 S. Ct. 289 (1971).
72. See Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967);
Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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